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Three vote-share equations are estimated and analyzed in this paper, one
for presidential elections, one for on-term House elections, and one for mid-
term House elections. The sample period is 19162006. Considering the
three equations together allows one to test whether the same economic vari-
ables affect each and to examine various serial correlation and coattail pos-
sibilities. The resulting three equation model can then be analyzed dynami-
cally, which is done in Section 4.
Themain conclusions are briey: 1)There is strong evidence that the econ-
omy affects all three vote shares and in remarkably similar ways. 2) There
is no evidence of any presidential coattail effects on the on-term House elec-
tions. The presidential vote share and the on-term House vote share are
highly positively correlated, but this is because they are affected by some
of the same variables. 3) There is positive serial correlation in the House
vote in that the previous mid-term House vote share positively affects the
on-term House vote share and the previous on-term House vote share posi-
tively affects the mid-term House vote share. 4) The presidential vote share
has a negative effect on the next mid-term House vote share. The most likely
explanation for this is a balance argument, where voters are reluctant to let
one party become too dominant. Ruled out as possible explanations for this
fourth result is any reversal of a coattail effect, since there is no evidence of
∗Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715; Fax: 203-432-6167; email: ray.fair@yale.edu; website:
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an effect in the rst place, and a regression to the mean, since the positive
serial correlation in the House vote implies no such regression. Also, it is not
simply voting against the party in the White House, because the presidential
variable is a vote share variable not a 0,1 incumbency variable.
1 Introduction
While there is general agreement in the literature that the economy affects voting
behavior for president in the United States, there is no such agreement regarding
voting behavior forCongress. In recentwork, the results in Erikson (1990), Alesina
and Rosenthal (1989), and Lynch (2002) are negative regarding the effects of the
economy on votes for Congress, whereas the results in Jacobson (1990), Kiewiet
and Udell (1998), and Grier and McGarrity (2002) are positive. In addition, there
is no general agreement about the size, if any, of presidential coattails on on-
term congressional elections and the effect of any coattails on the next mid-term
congressional election.
In this paper three vote-share equations are estimated, one for presidential
elections, one for on-term House elections, and one for mid-term House elections.
The sample period is 19162006, which results in 23 observations per equation. An
advantage of considering the three equations together is that one can test whether
the same economic variables affect each and examine various serial correlation and
coattail possibilities. The presidential vote equation is the one originally presented
in Fair (1978), with the current version in Fair (2006). The theory behind this
equation is reviewed in Section 2. This theory is also used to guide the specication
of the House equations. The equations are then estimated and tested in Section 3,
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and the resulting three equation model is analyzed in Section 4. The results are
summarized in Section 5. Maximum likelihood estimates and some coattail tests
are presented in Appendix A, and the data are presented in Appendix B.
It will be seen that the three economic variables that are signicant in the
presidential equation are also signicant in the on-term House equation. Also,
remarkably, the hypothesis that the estimated relative weights on the three eco-
nomic variables in the presidential equation are the same in the on-term House
equation is not rejected. On the other hand, the absolute size of the coefcient
estimates in the on-term House equation is only about .6 the size of the coef-
cient estimates in the presidential equation. In addition, the party's vote share in
the previous (mid-term) House election is a signicant explanatory variable in the
on-term House equation with a coefcient of about .6. (For the presidential equa-
tion no lagged-share variables are signicant.) The estimates thus show that the
on-term House equation is similar to the presidential equation, but with a smaller
absolute effect of the economic variables on the vote share and with the addition
of a lagged-share variable. There is no evidence of a presidential coattail effect on
the on-term House elections. A party's presidential vote share and on-term House
vote share are highly positively correlated, but this is explained by the fact that the
same economic variables appear in both equations.
In the mid-term House equation two economic variables, similar to two of
the three economic variables in the other two equations, are signicant or nearly
signicant. Focusing only on these two economic variables, the hypothesis that
the estimated relative weights in the presidential equation are the same in the mid-
term House equation is not rejected. Again, the absolute size of the coefcient
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estimates is smaller, about .5 the size of the coefcient estimates in the presidential
equation. As in the on-term House equation, the party's vote share in the previous
(on-term) House election is a signicant variable in the mid-term House equation.
It has a coefcient estimate of about .75. In addition, the party's vote share in
the previous presidential election is a signicant variable in the mid-term House
equation, with a negative coefcient estimate of about −.35. The estimates thus
show that the economy also matters for mid-term House elections, as does the
party's previous performances in both the House and presidential elections. Doing
well in the previous on-term election in the House helps a party's performance in
the next mid-term House election, whereas doing well in the previous presidential
election hurts. It is argued in Section 3 that the most likely explanation of this
negative effect is that, other things equal, voters like balance.
It will also be seen that the hypothesis that the on-term and mid-term House
equations are the same is strongly rejected by the data, as is the hypothesis that
the presidential equation and either of the House equations are the same. These
rejections thus suggest that constraining the coefcients in any pair of equations
to be the same is problematic. Kramer (1971) in his classic paper constrained
the coefcients in his equation explaining the presidential vote to be the same as
the coefcients in his equation explaining the congressional vote. He found that
the presidential vote was not very responsive to economic conditions, which, as
discussed in Fair (1978), may have been due to this constraint. Erickson (1990,
pp. 394395) also argues that pooling mid-term and on-term House elections is
a misspecication. Of the papers mentioned above, Erikson (1990), Jacobson
(1990) and Lynch (2002) deal only with mid-term elections and so don't impose
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any constraints. Kiewiet and Udell (1998) present only estimates for the case
in which the on-term and mid-term House equations are constrained to have the
same coefcients, although their F tests generally reject the hypothesis that the
coefcients are the same. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) are unusual in presenting
estimates for both the House and the Senate, but their House equation treats both
the on-term and mid-term elections the same. Grier and McGarrity (2002) also
combine the on-term and mid-term House elections except for adding a dummy
variable that is one in on-term elections and zero in mid-term elections.
2 Theory
Presidential Equation
The following is a review of the theoretical framework in Fair (1978), modied
slightly to be able to deal with House elections at the end of this section. Consider a
presidential election. Assume that there are only two political parties, Democratic
(D) and Republican (R), and consider a presidential election held at time t. (An
election held at time t will be referred to as election t.) Let UDit denote voter i's
expected future utility if the Democratic candidate is elected, and letURit denote the
same thing if the Republican candidate is elected. These expectations should be
considered as being made at time t. Let Vit be a variable that is equal to 1 if voter
i votes for the Democratic candidate and to 0 if voter i votes for the Republican
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candidate. The rst main postulate of the model is that
Vit =






Equation (1) states that voter i votes for the candidate that gives him or her the
highest expected future utility.
Let td1 denote the last election from t back that the Democratic party was in
power; let td2 denote the second-to-last election from t back that the Democratic
party was in power; let tr1 and tr2 denote the same things for the Republican party;
and let Mj denote some measure of economic performance of the party in power
during the four years1 prior to election j. If the Democratic party was in power
at time t, then td1 is equal to t; otherwise tr1 is equal to t. Also, let DPERDt
be equal to 1 if a Democratic incumbent is running again and 0 otherwise, and let
DPERRt be equal to 1 if a Republican incumbent is running again and 0 otherwise.
Finally, let DURDt denote a duration variable that is 1 if the Democratic party has
been in power for two consecutive terms, 1 + k if three consecutive terms, 1 +
2k if four consecutive terms, and so on, and 0 otherwise, and let DURRt denote
the similar variable for the Republican party. k is chosen in the empirical work
on best-tting grounds. The value chosen was 0.25, although the results are not















1Actually, not quite four years, since elections are held in early November. In the empirical















where β1, β2, β3, β4, γ1, and γ2 are unknown coefcients and ρ is an unknown
discount rate. The ξDit and ξ
R
it variables are specic to voter i for election t and
are assumed not to depend on any of the other variables. M∗ is (in the voters'
minds) the normal or neutral value of M . It is assumed to be the same across
elections. As discussed below, γ1 is expected to be positive and γ2 is expected to
be negative.
Equations (2) and (3) determine how expectations are formed, and, as discussed
in Fair (1978), they are general enough to incorporate the theories ofDowns (1957),
Kramer (1971), and Stigler (1973). Kramer's theory is a special case, where ρ = ∞
and β1 = β3. In Stigler's theory voters weight both recent and past periods, but
recent periods more, which corresponds to a positive (but not innite) value of
ρ. Downs' theory is probably best characterized as one in which voters acquire
more information than Kramer assumes, but less that Stigler assumes. Thus, for
example, β2 and β4 might be zero for Downs but not for Stigler.
TheDPER andDUR variables in equations (2) and (3) are picking up opposite
effects. The duration variable says that expected future utility under an incumbent
party is lower, other things being equal, the longer has the party been in power.
The person variable says that expected future utility under an incumbent party is
higher, other things being equal, if the President himself (himself so far) is running
again. In the rst case a lack of variety decreases utilitya party wears out its
welcomeand in the second case it increases ita President himself is a familiar
gure and this may add to expected future utility. It will be seen that both of these
7
variables are signicant in the presidential vote equation, with opposite signs.
Three further aggregation assumptions are needed to allow an aggregate
voting equation to be estimated. The rst is that the coefcients β1, β2, β3, β4, γ1,
γ2, and ρ in equations (2) and (3) are the same for all voters and that all voters use
the same measure of performance and the same value of M∗. Differences across


















+γ1DPERt + γ2DURt (5)
where DPERt = DPER
D
t − DPERRt and DURt = DURDt − DURRt . Then




1 if qt > ψit
0 otherwise
(6)
The second aggregation assumption is thatψit is evenly distributed across voters
in each election between a + δt and b + δt, where a < 0 and b > 0. δt is specic
to election t, but a and b are constant across all elections. The third aggregation
assumption is that there are an innite number of voters in each election. The last
two assumptions imply that ψt is uniformly distributed between a + δt and b + δt,
where the i subscript is now dropped from ψit. The probability density function








The cumulative distribution function for ψt, denoted F (ψt), is
F (ψt) =

0 for ψt ≤ a + δt
ψt−a−δt
b−a for a + δt < ψt < b + δt
0 for ψt ≥ b + δt
(8)
Let Vt denote the Democratic share of the two-party vote in election t. From
the above assumptions, Vt is equal to the probability that ψt is less than or equal
to qt. The probability that ψt is less than or equal to qt is merely the cumulative











It will be convenient to rewrite equation (9) as
Vt = λ0 + λ1qt + εt (10)
where λ0 = −a/(b−a), λ1 = 1/(b−a), and εt = −δt/(b−a). Finally, combining
equations (5) and (10) yields:












+ λ1γ1DPERt + λ1γ2DURt + εt (11)
Given assumptions about the measure of performance and about εt, equation (11)
can be estimated.
To review the theory, ψit in equation (4) is the Republican bias, positive or
negative, for voter i for election t. qt in equation (5) is the difference in expected
2If ψt is normally distributed rather than uniformly distributed, then Vt in equation (9) is no
longer a linear function of qt. However, since Vt only varies between about 0.35 and 0.65, Vt will
be approximately linear in qt over its relevant range if ψt is normally distributed.
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future utility for each voter between the Democratic and Republican candidates
from the economic measures and the DPER and DUR variables. Equation (6)
says that voter i votes for the Democratic candidate if qt exceeds ψit and for the
Republican candidate otherwise. Equation (7) then states how the Republican bias
is distributed across voters in election t. If, for example, δt is randomally distributed
across elections, then the bias is randomally distributed across elections. The bias
is zero for election t if a = −b and δt = 0.
Note that the right hand side variables in equations (2) and (3) are meant to
be causalto directly affect expected future utility. They are not simply meant to
be correlated with expected future utility. For example, a survey of voters asking
them how they think the president is doing or how they plan to vote is likely to
be correlated with their expected future utility under each party, but it is not that
their answers directly affect their expected future utility. Their answers are just
reecting it. Survey variables are thus not appropriate for the theory.
In the empirical work in Fair (1978), which considered only presidential elec-
tions, the hypothesis that β1 = β3 was tested and not rejected. In addition, the
estimates of ρ were very large, and for practical purposes they were innite. The
results thus supported Kramer's (1971) theory over those of Downs (1957) and
Stigler (1973). If β1 = β3 and ρ is innite, equation (11) becomes
3
Vt = λ0 + λ1β1(Mt − M∗)It + λ1γ1DPERt + λ1γ2DURt + εt (12)
where It equals 1 if there is aDemocratic incumbent and−1 if there is a Republican
incumbent.
3If ρ is innite, the Mtd2 and Mtr2 terms in equation (11) drop out.
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Finally, nothing precludes there being more than one measure of performance.
Assume that Mt is a linear function of three economic variables:
Mt − M∗ = ω1(M1t − M∗1 ) + ω2(M2t − M∗2 ) + ω3(M3t − M∗3 ) (13)
Substituting (13) into (12) then yields:
Vt = α0+α1M1tIt+α2M2tIt+α3M3tIt+α4DPERt+α5DURt+α6It+εt (14)
whereα0 = λ0,α1 = λ1β1ω1,α2 = λ1β1ω2,α3 = λ1β1ω3,α4 = λ1γ1,α5 = λ1γ2,
and α6 = −(λ1β1ω1M∗1 +λ1β1ω2M∗2 +λ1β1ω3M∗3 ). Equation (14) is the equation
that is estimated in the next section for presidential elections.
House Equations
Consider rst the on-term House elections. If it is the case that voters praise or
blame the party in power in the White House for the economy, then the above
theory can with one exception carry over directly to the on-term House elections,
where the party in power means the party in the White House. The exception
is the question of how to incorporate the possibility that a party's vote share in
the previous House election has an effect on its vote share in the current House
election.
One way to do this is to assume that δt depends on the previous vote share:
δt = θ0 + θ1(V
cc
t−2 − 50) + ηt , θ1 < 0 (15)
where V cct−2 is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in the previous mid-term
House election.4 Remember that δt reects how the Republican bias is distributed
4Subtracting 50 in equation (15) only affects the estimate of the constant term. Otherwise, the
estimated equation is exactly the same.
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across voters in election t, and so equation (15) says that the Republican bias as
it relates to the House depends on the previous results for the House. If θ1 is
negative, then equation (15) says that the Republican bias in the current on-term
House election depends negatively on the Democratic party's performance in the
previous mid-term House election.
Without considering the lagged vote share variable and under the assumptions
that β1 = β3 and that ρ is innite, equation (14) is relevant for the on-term House
elections, where the left-hand-side variable is theDemocratic share of the two-party
on-term House vote. In the theory just realize that candidate means candidate
for representative rather than for president and that all voters in the country are
included in the distribution of the Republican bias variable, ψit. Postulating that δt
is determined as in equation (15) has the effect of simply adding V cct−2 to the right
hand side of equation (14). Since εt = −δt/(b − a), equation (15) can be solved
for εt and this expression substituted into equation (14). Equation (14) is the same
except that the constant term is now α0−θ0/(b−a)+50θ1/(b−a), the coefcient
on V cct−2 is−θ1/(b− a), and the error term is−ηt/(b− a). Since θ1 is negative, the
coefcient on V cct−2 is positive. Equation (14) as so modied is the equation that is
estimated in the next section for the on-term House elections.
Consider now the mid-term House elections. Again, if it is the case that voters
praise or blame the party in power in the White House for the economy, then the
above theory can be carried over, although the time period for the measure of
performance is different. For presidential and on-term House elections the time
period is the 15 quarters prior to the election, whereas formid-termHouse elections
the time period since the new (or re-elected) president has taken over is only 7
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quarters. Also, the variable DPER is not relevant because there is no presidential
election at the same time. Regarding possible effects of previous vote shares, if
a party's vote shares in both the previous presidential election and the previous
on-term House election affect the party's vote share in the current mid-term House
election, this can be incorporated into the theory by assuming that
δt = φ0 + φ1(V
c
t−2 − 50) + φ2(V
p
t−2 − 50) + µt , φ1 < 0, φ2 > 0, (16)
where V ct−2 is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in the previous on-term
House election and V pt−2 is the Democratic share of the two-party vote in the
previous presidential election.
Without considering the lagged vote share variables, equation (14) is also rel-
evant for the mid-term House elections, where the left-hand-side variable is the
Democratic share of the two-party mid-term House vote. Also, the DPER vari-
able is dropped, and the time period for the economic variables is just the rst 7
quarters of an administration, not the rst 15. Postulating that δt is determined as
in equation (16) has the effect of simply adding V ct−2 and V
p
t−2 to the right hand side
of equation (14). Again, since εt = −δt/(b−a), equation (16) can be solved for εt
and this expression substituted into equation (14). Equation (14) is the same except
that the constant term is now α0 − φ0/(b − a) + 50φ1/(b − a) + 50φ2/(b − a),
the coefcient on V cct−2 is −φ1/(b − a), the coefcient on V
p
t−2 is −φ2/(b − a),
and the error term is −µt/(b − a). Since φ1 is negative, the coefcient on V ct−2 is
positive, and since φ2 is positive, the coefcient on V
p
t−2 is negative. Equation (14)
as so modied is the equation that is estimated in the next section for the mid-term
House elections.
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3 Estimated Equations and Tests
The Presidential Equation
The variables that are used in the estimation work are listed in Table 1. The coef-
cient estimates are presented in Table 2: there is one estimate for the presidential
equation and two each for the on-term and mid-term House elections. Table 3
presents the predicted values and estimated residuals from these ve regressions.
Consider rst the presidential equation. The rst economic variable, G, is the
growth rate (at an annual rate) of real per capita GDP in the rst three quarters
of the election year. The second, P , is the absolute value of the ination rate (at
an annual rate) in the rst 15 quarters of the administration. The third, Z, is the
number of quarters in the rst 15 in which the growth rate of per capital GDP
exceeded 3.2 percent at an annual rate. There is thus one short horizon variable,
G, and two that pertain to the entire period of the administration up to the time of
the election, P and Z.
The variable Z is a good news variable in that it measures the number of
quarters in the administration in which the growth rate was noticeably strong.
There is some evidence frompsychology experiments that people tend to remember
extreme outcomesmore than normal ones, andZ can be considered to be ameasure
of extreme positive growth outcomes. Like the value for k in the denition of
DUR, the cutoff value of 3.2 percent for Z was chosen on best-tting grounds. As
discussed below, values of 2.7 and 3.7 gave similar results. A bad news variables





V p Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote.
V c Democratic share of the two-party on-term House vote.
V cc Democratic share of the two-party mid-term House vote.
I 1 if there is a Democratic presidential incumbent at the time of the
election and −1 if there is a Republican presidential incumbent.
DPER 1 if a Democratic presidential incumbent is running again, −1 if a
Republican presidential incumbent is running again, and 0 otherwise.
DUR 0 if either party has been in the White House for one term, 1 [−1] if
the Democratic [Republican] party has been in the White House for
two consecutive terms, 1.25 [−1.25] if the Democratic [Republican]
party has been in the White House for three consecutive terms, 1.50
[−1.50] if the Democratic [Republican] party has been in the White
House for four consecutive terms, and so on.
WAR 1 for the elections of 1918, 1920, 1942, 1944, 1946, and 1948, and 0
otherwise.
G growth rate of real per capita GDP in the rst three quarters of the
on-term election year (annual rate).
Gcc growth rate of real per capita GDP in the rst three quarters of the
mid-term election year (annual rate).
P absolute value of the growth rate of the GDP deator in the rst 15
quarters of the administration (annual rate) except for 1920, 1944, and
1948, where the values are zero.
P cc absolute value of the growth rate of the GDP deator in the rst 7
quarters of the administration (annual rate) except for 1918, 1942,
and 1946, where the values are zero.
Z number of quarters in the rst 15 quarters of the administration in
which the growth rate of real per capitaGDP is greater than 3.2 percent
at an annual rate except for 1920, 1944, and 1948, where the values
are zero.
Zcc 157 times number of quarters in the rst 7 quarters of the administration
in which the growth rate of real per capita GDP is greater than 3.2
percent at an annual rate except for 1918, 1942, and 1946, where the
values are zero.
• Sample period: 1916, 1920, . . . , 2004 for the V p and V c equations and 1918,




Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 2a Eq. 3 Eq. 3a
V p V c V c V cc V cc
Index − − 0.584 − 0.528
( 6.89) ( 2.42)
G · I 0.680 0.413 0.397 − −
( 6.14) ( 4.11)
P · I or P cc · I −0.657 −0.305 −0.384 −0.464 −0.347
(−2.26) (−1.18) (−2.27)
Z · I or Zcc · I 1.075 0.641 0.628 0.479 0.568
( 4.31) ( 2.84) ( 1.84)
DPER 3.30 2.62 2.70 − −
( 2.34) ( 2.47) ( 2.89)
DUR −3.33 − − − −
(−2.75)
I −2.74 −4.74 −4.42 −2.27 −2.85
(−1.08) (−2.60) (−4.83) (−1.79) (−2.78)
WAR 5.61 4.11 3.69 −0.31 0.40
( 2.09) ( 1.74) ( 2.21) (−0.14) ( 0.20)
CNST 47.32 49.56 49.56 48.78 48.81
(75.54) (87.87) (93.55) (68.11) (68.97)
V cc−2 − 50 − 0.637 0.630 − −
( 4.93) ( 5.64)
V c−2 − 50 − − − 0.796 0.748
( 4.59) ( 4.63)
V p−2 − 50 − − − −0.326 −0.355
(−2.35) (−2.67)
SE 2.54 2.22 2.09 2.30 2.27
R2 0.914 0.864 0.863 0.815 0.808
No. obs. 23 23 23 23 23
• Estimation method: OLS.
• Estimation period: 19162004 for V p and V c, 1918-2006 for V cc.
• t-statistics are in parentheses.
• Index for V c is 0.680 · G · I − 0.657 · P · I + 1.075 · Z · I . The
hypothesis that the weights in this index are correct is not rejected:
F-value of 0.048, which with 2,15 degrees of freedom has a p-value
of 0.953.
• Index for V cc is−0.657 ·P cc · I + 1.075 ·Zcc · I . The hypothesis
that the weights in this index are correct is not rejected: F-value of
0.656, which with 1,16 degrees of freedom has a p-value of 0.430.
• Values in italics are implied values.
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Table 3
Predicted Values and Estimated Residuals from Table 2
Act. Eq. 1 Act. Eq. 2 Eq. 2a Act. Eq. 3 Eq. 3a
t V p V̂ p ûp V c V̂ c ûc V̂ c ûc V cc V̂ cc ûcc V̂ cc ûcc t + 2
1916 51.7 49.8 -1.9 48.9 49.2 0.3 49.2 0.3 45.1 44.8 -0.3 44.9 -0.2 1918
1920 36.1 39.1 3.0 38.0 41.1 3.1 41.2 3.2 46.4 45.2 -1.2 44.3 -2.1 1922
1924 41.8 42.0 0.3 42.1 46.2 4.1 46.3 4.2 41.6 42.4 0.8 42.6 1.1 1926
1928 41.2 42.8 1.7 42.8 42.6 -0.3 42.5 -0.3 45.9 47.4 1.5 47.9 2.0 1930
1932 59.2 61.2 2.1 56.9 54.7 -2.2 54.7 -2.2 56.2 51.2 -5.0 51.3 -4.9 1934
1936 62.5 63.9 1.5 58.5 61.2 2.8 61.1 2.6 50.8 52.3 1.5 51.5 0.7 1938
1940 55.0 55.8 0.8 53.0 54.7 1.7 54.9 1.9 47.7 46.9 -0.7 46.8 -0.9 1942
1944 53.8 52.2 -1.5 51.7 51.8 0.1 51.8 0.0 45.3 46.3 1.1 46.3 1.0 1946
1948 52.4 50.9 -1.4 53.2 50.0 -3.2 50.0 -3.3 50.0 51.3 1.3 51.1 1.1 1950
1952 44.6 45.2 0.6 50.2 48.9 -1.3 48.9 -1.3 52.8 52.3 -0.5 52.8 0.0 1954
1956 42.2 43.6 1.4 51.2 51.4 0.2 51.2 0.0 56.4 54.8 -1.6 55.1 -1.3 1958
1960 50.1 49.1 -1.0 54.5 55.6 1.2 55.5 1.0 52.4 53.6 1.2 53.7 1.3 1962
1964 61.3 61.3 -0.1 57.7 57.1 -0.6 57.2 -0.5 51.3 52.8 1.5 52.9 1.5 1965
1968 49.6 50.1 0.5 50.8 51.3 0.4 51.2 0.3 54.2 53.2 -1.1 53.0 -1.2 1970
1972 38.2 41.6 3.4 52.7 50.8 -1.8 50.9 -1.7 58.6 58.7 0.1 58.2 -0.4 1974
1976 51.1 50.5 -0.6 57.2 57.4 0.2 57.7 0.5 54.4 52.9 -1.6 53.5 -0.9 1978
1980 44.7 45.7 1.0 51.3 49.6 -1.7 49.3 -1.9 56.2 55.0 -1.2 54.5 -1.7 1982
1984 40.8 37.9 -2.9 52.8 49.9 -2.9 50.0 -2.7 55.1 56.4 1.3 56.7 1.6 1986
1988 46.1 49.5 3.4 54.0 55.0 0.9 54.9 0.9 54.1 55.3 1.2 55.0 0.9 1990
1992 53.5 49.1 -4.3 52.8 52.9 0.1 52.8 0.0 46.4 48.6 2.2 48.4 2.0 1994
1996 54.7 53.0 -1.8 49.8 48.4 -1.5 48.5 -1.3 49.4 48.3 -1.1 48.6 -0.8 1998
2000 50.3 49.6 -0.6 49.8 49.6 -0.2 49.6 -0.1 47.6 51.7 4.1 52.1 4.5 2002
2004 48.8 45.4 -3.4 48.6 49.1 0.5 49.0 0.3 54.2 50.7 -3.5 50.9 -3.3 2006
RMSE 2.05 1.79 1.80 1.92 1.95
• ûp = V̂ p − V p.
• ûc = V̂ c − V c.
• ûcc = V̂ cc − V cc.
• RMSE = root mean squared error.
Theother explanatory variables in the presidential equation havebeendiscussed
in Section 2 except for WAR. The values of P and Z are large for the elections
of 1920, 1944, and 1948, due in large part to the world wars, and they have been
zeroed out in the estimation. This treatment leads to the WAR variable being an
explanatory variable in equation (14). To see this, assume that in equation (13) both
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(M2t −M∗2 ) and (M3t −M∗3 ) are multiplied by (1−WARt), where WARt is 1 in
1920, 1944, and 1948, and 0 otherwise. This then adds WARt as an explanatory




3 . WARt is
thus added to the equation because of M∗2 and M
∗
3 .
The estimates of the presidential equation in Table 2 show that the three eco-
nomic variables are signicant, as are DPER and DUR. A one percentage point
increase in the growth rate leads to a 0.680 percentage point increase in the vote
share; a one percentage point increase in the ination rate leads to a 0.657 decrease
in the vote share, and an increase in the number of strong growth quarters by one
leads to an increase in the vote share of 1.075 percentage points. If an incumbent is
running again, there is an advantage of 3.30 percentage points. The estimated stan-
dard error is 2.54 percentage points. The estimated residuals in Table 3 show that
for the 2004 election the Democratic share was underpredicted by 3.4 percentage
points: President Bush should have done better according to the equation.
The original specication of the presidential equation is in Fair (1978), and over
the years some specication changes have been made as new observations have
become available. Because of the small number of observations, data mining
spurious correlationis a potentially serious problem in the process of searching
for explanatory variables. Possible data mining issues in the present case are 1) the
use of 3.2 percent as the cutoff for theZ variable and the use of .25 in the denition
of DUR, both of which were chosen on best-tting grounds, 2) not counting Ford
as an incumbent running again for the DPER variable, and 3) the adjustments for
the two world wars. There is, however, some evidence in support of the view that
data mining is not a problem. First, the specication of the presidential equation
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has not changed since the 1992 election. The specication that was used for the
estimation period through 1992 (specied in 1994) is the same one that was used
for the estimation periods through 1996, 2000, and 2004. The only change since
1992 has been the reestimation of the equation through the latest data. The equation
has thus been around in its present form for over 12 years.
Second, when the equation is estimated only through 1960 (12 observations),
the coefcient estimates are fairly stable.5 BothG andZ are still highly signicant,
and P has a t-statistic of -1.42. Third, the coefcient estimates are fairly robust to
1) the use of 2.7 or 3.7 percent instead of 3.2 percent as the cutoff for theZ variable,
2) the use of 0.00 or 0.50 instead of 0.25 as the increment for the DUR variable,
and 3) counting Ford as an incumbent running again for the DPER variable. The
results are more sensitive to the treatment of the two world wars. If the adjustment
for the wars is not made, the t-statistic for the ination variable falls in absolute
value to−1.56, although bothG andZ remain signicantwith only slightly smaller
coefcient estimates. The ts areworse if the growth variable is only for the second
and third quarters of the election year or for the four quarters before the election,
but the growth variable always remains highly signicant. The ination variable
looses its signicance if only 11 quarters or only 7 quarters before the election
are used instead of 15, although its coefcient estimate is always negative. The
presidential equation is thus fairly robust; it seems unlikely that the signicance of
the economic variables is spurious.
5This result and the others discussed in this paragraph are presented in Fair (2006). In Fair (2006)
the left hand side variable is the incumbent party's vote share rather than the Democratic party's
vote share, but this makes no difference to the results. If Ṽ pt is the incumbent party's vote share,
then Ṽ pt = V
p
t · It + .5(1 − It). Using this denition and the fact that It · It = 1, the equation to
be estimated can be specied either way.
19
None of the lagged-share variables was signicant when added to the presi-
dential equation. When V p−4 − 50 was added, it had a coefcient estimate of 0.030
with a t-statistic of 0.17. When V c−4 − 50 was added, it had a coefcient estimate
of 0.177 with a t-statistic of 1.06. When V cc−2 − 50 was added, it had a coefcient
estimate of 0.036 with a t-statistic of 0.23.
The On-Term House Equation
No new explanatory variables are required for the on-term House equation except
the lagged value of the mid-term House share, denoted V cc−2 in Table 2. Two
estimates are presented for this equation, one where the three economic variables
are unconstrained and one where the weights on these variables are constrained
to be those estimated in the presidential equation. The duration variable, DUR,
was not close to being signicant in any of the House regressions, and so it was
dropped from the estimation for the House equations. (It has a coefcient estimate
of 0.271 with a t-statistic of 0.27 when added to equation 2a in Table 2, and it has a
coefcient estimate of −0.462 with a t-statistic of −0.45 when added to equation
3a.)
The results for the on-term House equation show that two of the three eco-
nomic variables (G andZ) are signicant when the economic variables are entered
separately. The other variable, P , has the expected sign but with a t-statistic of
only −1.18. When the relative weights are imposed, the resulting index variable
is highly signicant, with a coefcient estimate of 0.584. The hypothesis that the
restrictions are correct is not rejected. Imposing the restrictions hardly changes
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the t, with an F-value of only 0.048 and a resulting p-value of 0.953. The DPER
variable is signicant, which says that when a presidential incumbent is running
again, this helps his party in the House vote. The previous mid-term share variable
is signicant, with a coefcient estimate of 0.630 in equation 2a and a t-statistic
of 5.64.
No other lagged-share variable was signicant when added to the on-term
House equation. When V c−4 − 50 was added to equation 2a, it had a coefcient
estimate of 0.192 with a t-statistic of 1.07. When V p−4 − 50 was added, it had a
coefcient estimate of 0.027 with a t-statistic of 0.24.
Overall, the results for the on-term House equation provide strong support for
the view that the economy affects on-term House elections. In terms of the theory
in Section 2, the signicance of the previous mid-term share variable suggests that
the distribution of the Republican bias across voters for the House election is not
random from election to election. If, say, the Republican party has done well in
the last (mid-term) House election in that V cc−2 is small, then δt will be larger than
otherwise. In this sense there is positive serial correlation in the bias.
There is no evidence of a presidential coattail effect on the on-term House
vote. Tests regarding the error structure similar to those in Kramer (1971) and
Ferejohn and Calvert (1984) are performed in Appendix A, and the results indicate
no coattail effects. Perhaps evenmore compelling, whenV p, the actual presidential
vote share in the election, is added to equation 2a, it is not signicant, with a
coefcient estimate of 0.092 and a t-statistic of 0.52. Also, when the estimated
error from the presidential equation, V p − V̂ p, is added, it is not signicant, with a
coefcient estimate of 0.182 and a t-statistic of 0.85. It is true that V p and V c are
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highly positively correlated (correlation coefcient of 0.68 over the 23 elections),
but this is due to the fact that both are affected by similar variables, namely the
three economic variables and DPER. There is no evidence that the presidential
vote directly affects the on-term House vote.
Regarding data mining issues for the on-term House equation, no searching
was done over the economic variables. The exact three economic variables that
have been used in the presidential vote equation since 1992 were simply used in
the on-term House equation.
The Mid-Term House Equation
Two new explanatory variables are needed for the mid-term House equation in
addition to the two lagged-share variables, V c−2 and V
p
−2. These are P
cc and Zcc.
They are the same as P and Z, respectively, except that they pertain to the rst 7
quarters of the administration rather than the rst 15. For comparison purposes,
Zcc is multiplied by 15
7
to give it the same order of magnitude as Z.
It turned out that G was never close to being signicant in the mid-term House
equation, and so it was dropped. For example, when it is added to equation 3a in
Table 2, it has a coefcient estimate of 0.022 with a t-statistic of 0.27. Table 2
shows that when the other two economic variables are included separately, P cc has
a t-statistic of −2.27 and Zcc has a t-statistic of 1.84. When the weights on these
two variables are constrained to be those estimated in the presidential equation,
the resulting index variable is signicant, with a coefcient estimate of 0.528. The
hypothesis that the restrictions are correct is not rejected. The F-value is 0.656 and
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the resulting p-value is 0.430.
The two lagged-share variables are signicant. In equation 3a in Table 2 the
coefcient estimate for the previous (on-term) House vote share is 0.748 with a t-
statistic of 4.63 and the coefcient estimate for the previous presidential vote share
is−0.355 with a t-statistic of −2.67. Holding the previous presidential vote share
constant, an increase in the previous (on-term) House vote share of 1 percentage
point increases the current (mid-term)House vote share by 0.748 percentage points.
The theoretical explanation for this is the same as that above for the effect of the
previous mid-term House vote share on the current on-term House vote share. The
coefcient in this case is slightly larger: 0.748 versus 0.630. So again there is
positive serial correlation in the bias regarding the House elections. On the other
hand, holding the previous (on-term) House vote share constant, an increase in
the previous presidential vote share of 1 percentage point decreases the current
(mid-term) House vote share by 0.355 percentage points.
The negative coefcient estimate for the previous presidential vote share in
the mid-term House equation is a robust result. For example, when the estimated
error from the presidential equation, V p−2 − V̂
p
−2, is added to equation 3a, it is not
signicant, with a coefcient estimate of−0.267 and a t-statistic of−1.07. V p−2−50
is still signicant, with a coefcient estimate of −0.346 and a t-statistic of −2.61.
Also, when V cc−4 − 50 is added to equation 3a, it is not signicant (coefcient
estimate of −0.158 and t-statistic of −0.88) and V p−2 − 50 is still signicant, with
a coefcient estimate of−0.415 and a t-statistic of−2.76. The overall results thus
strongly show that there is positive serial correlation in the House vote in that 1)
the previous mid-term House vote positively affects the on-term House vote and
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2) the previous on-term House vote positively affects the mid-term House vote.
The coefcient estimates (equations 2a and 3a) are 0.630 and 0.748, respectively.
But the results also show that the previous presidential vote has a negative effect
on the mid-term House vote.
An important question is why this negative presidential vote effect? In the
theory in Section 2 this means that the Republican bias for the mid-term election
depends positively on the size of the previous Democratic presidential vote share.
The larger the Democratic share, the more the bias in favor of the Republicans.
But a deeper question is why is this the case? It can't be from a reversal of a
positive coattail effect in the previous election because there is no evidence of a
coattail effect in the rst place. It also can't simply be a vote against the party in
the White House at the time of the mid-term election because it is the size of the
previous presidential vote share that matters, not which party controls the White
House. For example, if the Democrats get 42 percent in one presidential election
and 48 percent in another, losing both times, the mid-term equation says that the
Democrats will still get more mid-term House votes in the rst case than in the
second, other things being equal. Note also that since there are economic variables
in the mid-term House equation, effects of a good or bad economy have already
been taken into account. Also, there is not a reversion to the mean, other things
being equal, but the opposite: the previous on-termHouse vote share has a positive
effect on the mid-term House vote share.
One possible explanation for the negative presidential effect is a balance ar-
gument. If voters, other things being equal, don't like one party becoming too
dominant, they may tend to vote more against a party in the mid-term election the
24
better the party has done in the previous presidential election. The idea of balance
is stressed in Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) and Erickson (1988). Neither of these
studies uses the previous presidential vote share as an explanatory variable in the
House equations, instead using 0,1 incumbency dummy variables, but the balance
idea can be carried over to the vote share.6
Erickson (1990, p. 394) in discussing the presidential penalty in mid-term
elections argues for a balance effect over simply voting against the party in the
White House no matter what. He also argues against any economic effects: In
any case the economy is not responsible. Midterm loss results under all economic
circumstances. And the severity of midterm loss is not predictable from the health
of the economy. (p. 394). The present results run counter to this and show
signicant economic effects in the mid-term equation. There is, however, nothing
inconsistent with there existing both a balance effect and economic effects, as
found here. In the mid-term House equation both the economic variables and the
previous presidential vote share variable are signicant.
Regarding the lagged-share variables, sometimes in the literature, following
Tufte (1975), the left hand side variable in House equations is taken to be the
party's current vote share minus the party's mean House vote share in the past
eight elections, and sometimes it is taken to be the change in the vote share from
6Erickson (1988, p. 1023, fn. 4) reports that he added the previous presidential vote share
to his mid-term House equation and got a negative, but insignicant, coefcient estimate. This
negative coefcient estimate is consistent with the present results, although in the present case the
coefcient estimate is also signicant. Campbell (1985) has a party's previous presidential vote
share as an explanatory variable in an equation explaining the change in the party's House seats
in the mid-term election. The coefcient estimate is negative and signicant. Campbell (1985,
p. 1154) attributes this in part to coattail effects and surge-and-decline (regression to the mean)
effects, which, as argued above, seems unlikely to be the correct explanation.
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the previous election. Neither of these specications is consistent with the present
results. First, no lagged-share variables were found to be signicant more than
two years (one election) back, which argues against using the eight-election mean
share. Second, the coefcient estimates of the lagged House vote share variables
are signicantly less than one, which argues against using the change in the vote
share and thus imposing a coefcient of one.
As with the on-term House equation, no searching was done for the mid-term
House equation regarding the economic variables. The only change was that the
period of interest is the rst 7 quarters of an administration rather than the rst 15.
Finally, it should be obvious from Table 2 that the three equations are not the
same. To begin with, the coefcient estimates of the Index variables are signif-
icantly different from one. But even more compelling, the equations have some
different explanatory variables. The results strongly suggest that the equations
should not be constrained to have the same coefcients.
4 Three Equation Model
Equations 1, 2a, and 3a in Table 2 form a three equationmodel that can be analyzed
as a complete system. Because of the lagged values in equations 2a and 3a, the
House predictions in Table 3, which are based on the actual values of the lagged
variables, are not the same as those generated from a dynamic solution of the
model. Given the actual values of all the variables except the three vote share
variables, a dynamic solution can be computed from 1916 through 2006, where
the predicted vote share variables from the previous election are used in solving
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for the current election. This solution has no effect on the presidential predictions
because there are no lagged values in equation 1: the predicted values of V p from
the dynamic solution are the same as those in Table 3. The predicted values of V c
and V cc are different, and these are presented in Table 4.
The root mean squared error (RMSE) for V c for the dynamic solution is 2.13
percentage points in Table 4, which compares to 1.80 in Table 3. For V cc the RMSE
is 2.50 versus 1.95 in Table 3. Thus, not surprisingly, the t is somewhat worse for
the dynamic solution, since this solution uses no actual values of the lagged-share
variables except the House vote share for 1914 (the initial condition).
The three equation model can also be used to examine the effects over time
of changing the economic variables. Since the model is linear, it does not matter
in which year the change is made regarding the dynamic effects. For illustration,
three experiments were run. For each experiment the estimated residuals were
rst added to the equations and taken to be exogenous. This means that when the
model is solved using the actual values of all the exogenous variables, a perfect
tracking solution results: the predicted values are equal to the actual values. For
the rst experiment, G was increased by 1 and the model solved. Since G is the
growth rate in the rst three quarters of the election year, this change is for the
period between a mid-term election and the next on-term election. The difference
between the predicted value of a variable and its actual values is the estimated
effect of this change. The results are reported in Table 5 in percentage points.
Table 5 shows that the presidential vote share is 0.680 percentage points higher
in the rst election after the change and then the same thereafter. As noted above,
there are no dynamic effects in the presidential equation, and so there is only a
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Table 4
Dynamic Solution of Equations 1, 2a, and 3a in Table 2
t V c V̂ c ûc V cc V̂ cc ûcc t + 2
1916 48.9 49.2 0.3 45.1 45.8 0.7 1918
1920 38.0 41.6 3.7 46.4 46.0 -0.4 1922
1924 42.1 46.0 3.9 41.6 45.4 3.9 1926
1928 42.8 45.0 2.1 45.9 48.9 3.0 1930
1932 56.9 56.6 -0.3 56.2 50.4 -5.8 1934
1936 58.5 57.4 -1.1 50.8 50.2 -0.6 1938
1940 53.0 54.5 1.5 47.7 47.7 0.0 1942
1944 51.7 51.8 0.1 45.3 46.9 1.6 1946
1948 53.2 51.0 -2.3 50.0 50.0 -0.1 1950
1952 50.2 48.9 -1.3 52.8 51.6 -1.2 1954
1956 51.2 50.5 -0.8 56.4 54.0 -2.4 1958
1960 54.5 54.0 -0.5 52.4 53.7 1.3 1962
1964 57.7 58.0 0.3 51.3 53.1 1.8 1965
1968 50.8 52.3 1.4 54.2 53.9 -0.4 1970
1972 52.7 50.7 -2.0 58.6 55.6 -3.1 1974
1976 57.2 55.8 -1.4 54.4 52.7 -1.8 1978
1980 51.3 48.2 -3.1 56.2 51.9 -4.3 1982
1984 52.8 47.3 -5.5 55.1 53.6 -1.5 1986
1988 54.0 54.0 0.0 54.1 53.7 -0.3 1990
1992 52.8 52.6 -0.2 46.4 49.8 3.4 1994
1996 49.8 50.7 0.9 49.4 49.8 0.4 1998
2000 49.8 49.9 0.2 47.6 52.5 4.9 2002
2004 48.6 52.0 3.4 54.2 54.6 0.4 2006
RMSE 2.13 2.50
• ûc = V̂ c − V c.
• ûcc = V̂ cc − V cc.
• RMSE = root mean squared error.




Effects of Changing Economic Variables
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Year V p V c V cc V p V c V cc V p V c V cc
2 − − − − − − − − 1.215
4 0.680 0.397 − 1.075 0.627 − 1.075 1.393 −
6 − − 0.056 − − 0.088 − − 0.661
8 0.000 0.035 − 0.000 0.056 − 0.000 0.416 −
10 − − 0.026 − − 0.042 − − 0.311
12 0.000 0.017 − 0.000 0.026 − 0.000 0.196 −
14 − − 0.012 − − 0.020 − − 0.147
16 0.000 0.008 − 0.000 0.012 − 0.000 0.092 −
18 − − 0.006 − − 0.009 − − 0.069
20 0.000 0.004 − 0.000 0.006 − 0.000 0.043 −
• Experiment 1: G changed by 1.
• Experiment 2: Z changed by 1.
• Experiment 3: Z changed by 1 and Zcc changed by 1 times 157 .
• Values are in percentage points. Each is the value of the variable after the
change minus the value of the variable before the change.
one-time effect. The on-term House vote is 0.397 higher in the rst election. This
value is 0.584, the coefcient estimate for Index in equation 2a in Table 2, times
0.680. This effect is smaller than that for the presidential vote. The next mid-term
House vote is then larger, by 0.056 percentage points. This value is the net effect in
equation 3a of the positive effect from the larger previous on-term House vote and
the negative effect from the larger previous presidential vote. The next on-term
House election is then 0.035 larger, which is because of the larger previous mid-
term House vote. Then the next mid-term House vote is larger, by 0.026, because
of the larger previous on-term House vote, and so on. The effects after the rst
election are all fairly small.
For the second experiment Z was increased by 1one additional quarter of
strong growth. Zcc was not changed, which means that the additional quarter is in
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the period between a mid-term election and the next on-term election. The results
are also presented in Table 5. The pattern for this experiment is the same as the
pattern for the rst experiment. The effects for the rst election after the change are
1.075 and 0.627 percentage points, respectively, for the presidential and on-term
House vote, and then small positive effects for the House votes after that.
For the third experiment Z was increased by 1 and Zcc was increase by 1 times
15
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. This means that the additional strong growth quarter is in the period between
an on-term election and the next mid-term election. The results are in Table 5. In
this case the rst effect is on the mid-term House vote, which is larger by 1.215
percentage points. In the next on-term election the presidential vote is larger by
1.075, which is the same as it is for the second experiment. But the on-term House
vote is now 1.393 larger rather than 0.627 larger, primarily because it is positively
affected by the larger previous mid-term House vote. The next mid-term House
vote is 0.661 larger, which again is the net effect of the positive effect of the
larger previous on-term House vote and the negative effect of the larger previous
presidential vote. Then in the next on-term election the House vote is 0.416 larger,
and so on. As should be obvious, this experiment shows that theHouse vote ismore
affected by the economy if the change takes place before a mid-term election than
after it because of the positive serial correlation of the House vote share variables.
To save space, experiments changing the ination rate are not reported here,
but the stories are similar except with a negative sign.
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5 Conclusion
Considering the three vote share equations together has allowed various tests to be
made. The main conclusions are the following.
1. There is strong evidence that the economy affects all three vote shares. Not
only that, but the relative weights on the economic variables are the same for
the presidential and on-term House elections and are the same for two of the
three economic variables for the presidential and mid-term House elections.
2. There is no evidence of any presidential coattail effects on the on-termHouse
elections. The presidential vote share and the on-term House vote share are
highly positively correlated, but this is because they are affected by some of
the same variables.
3. There is positive serial correlation in the House vote in that the previous
mid-term House vote share positively affects the on-term House vote share
and the previous on-term House vote share positively affects the mid-term
House vote share. The results in Table 5 are examples of the dynamic effects.
4. The presidential vote share has a negative effect on the next mid-term House
vote share. This cannot be due to the reversal of a coattail effect, since there
is no evidence of an effect in the rst place. Also, it is not simply voting
against the party in the White House, because the presidential variable is a
vote share variable not a 0,1 incumbency variable. It is also not a regression
to the mean in that the above mentioned positive serial correlation in the
House vote implies no such regression. The most likely explanation is a
balance argument, where voters are reluctant to let one party become too
dominant.
On a few technical matters, rst, it is obvious from Table 2 that the three equa-
tions are not the same, and so it is problematic to constrain any of the equations to
be the same. Second, arguments have been presented in Section 3 that suggest that
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data mining may not be a serious issue for the current specications. The presiden-
tial equation is robust to a number of small changes; no searching has been done
for either the on-term or mid-term House equation; and the presidential equation
has not been changed since 1992. Third, the maximum likelihood estimates in
Appendix A are very similar to those in Table 2, and so the model is robust to
the estimation method. Fourth, the equations in Table 2 are structural, or causal,
in that no survey variables like presidential approval ratings and vote intentions
have been used. The aim is to explain voting behavior, not necessarily forecast it.
The equations can be used for forecasting, but only after forecasting the economic
variables rst. It may be the case that for pure forecasting purposes, especially
a few months before an election, the use of various voter surveys produces more
accurate forecasts than can be obtained using the equations in Table 2.
Note nally that no attempt has been made in this study to explain the number
of House seats per party. Translating vote shares into House seats is a complicated
matter, and this is beyond the scope of this study. However, if one had an equation
that explainedHouse seats as a function of vote shares, this equation could be added
to the three equations in Table 2, producing a four equationmodel explainingHouse
seats.
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Appendix A: FIML Estimates and Coattail Tests
It will be convenient to write the three equations that are estimated in Table 2 as:
V pt = X
p
t α
p + upt (17)





t−2 − 50) + uct (18)
V cct+2 = X
cc
t+2α
cc + λcc1 (V
c
t − 50) + λcc2 (V
p
t − 50) + ucct+2 (19)
where t = 1916, 1920, . . . , 2004, Xpt is the 1×8 vector of explanatory variables in
the presidential equation,Xct is the 1×7 vector of explanatory variables exceptV cct−2
in the on-term House equation, Xcct+2 is the 1 × 5 vector of explanatory variables
except V ct and V
p
t in the mid-term House equation, and α
p, αc, and αcc are 8 × 1,
7 × 1, and 5 × 1 vectors of coefcients respectively.
If the errors terms upt , u
c
t , and u
cc
t+2 are uncorrelated with each other and across
time and if there are no restrictions on the coefcients, then the maximum like-
lihood (ML) estimates of equations (17), (18), and (19) are simply the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates in Table 2 under Eq.1, Eq.2, and Eq.3. The























where the subscripts on the α coefcients correspond to the variables (excluding
Index) in order in Table 2. If the error terms are uncorrelated with each other
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and across time but the above restrictions are imposed, then the ML estimates are
not the same as the OLS estimates in Table 2 because for the ML estimates the
restrictions affect all three equations whereas for the OLS estimates the restrictions
affect only the second and third equations. Even without the restrictions imposed,
the ML estimates will differ from the OLS estimates if the error terms are assumed
to be correlated with each other.
ML estimates with the coefcient restrictions (20)(22) imposed and under the
assumption that the errors terms are correlated with each other are presented in
Table A. The parameters to estimate are the α and λ coefcients in equations (17),
(18), and (19) and the variances and covariances of the error terms. Denote the
variances of the three error terms as σ2up , σ
2
uc , and σ
2
ucc . The results in Table A
are similar to those in Table 2. The estimated t-statistics in Table A, unlike those
in Table 2, are not adjusted for degrees of freedom, which is the main reason for
the generally larger t-statistics in Table A. The estimated standard errors (square
roots of the estimated variances) are 2.06, 1.80, and 2.00 percentage points for
the three equations respectively. The correlations of the error terms, not reported
in Table A, are fairly small. The correlation coefcients are 0.207 for the error
terms in equations (17) and (18), −0.314 for equations (17) and (19), and 0.168
for equations (18) and (19). These low correlations help explain the similarity of




Eq. 1 Eq. 2 Eq. 3
V p V c V cc
G · I 0.688 0.392 −
( 8.28) ( 6.35)
P · I or P cc · I −0.682 −0.389 −0.315
(−3.54) (−1.93)
Z · I or Zcc · I 1.069 0.610 0.493
( 5.72)
DPER 2.85 2.83 −
( 2.50) ( 3.38)
DUR −3.60 − −
(−3.95)
I −2.29 −4.33 −2.43
(−1.31) (−4.08) (−2.60)
WAR 5.71 3.53 0.27
( 2.78) ( 2.25) ( 0.16)
CNST 47.31 49.58 49.04
(94.06) (108.88) (72.54)
V cc−2 − 50 − 0.626 −
( 6.63)
V c−2 − 50 − − 0.690
( 4.74)
V p−2 − 50 − − −0.307
(−2.48)
SE (σup , σuc , σucc ) 2.06 1.80 2.00
No. obs. 23 23 23
• Estimation method: ML.
• Coefcient constraints (20)(22) imposed.
• Errors assumed to be correlated across equations.
• t-statistics are in parentheses, not adjusted for degrees
of freedom.
• Values in italics are implied values.
Regarding coattail effects, Kramer (1971) tested these bypostulating that (using
the current notation):
upt = ut + vt (23)
35
uct = ut + γvt (24)
ucct+2 = wt+2 (25)
where ut, vt, and wt+2 are uncorrelated with each other and over time and where
ut and wt+2 have the same variance. From these assumptions γ can be estimated
by ML. γ is a measure of a coattail effect. Kramer also assumed that the same
variables appear in each of the three equations (except for the different time period
for the mid-term equation) with the same coefcients. His estimate of γ was about
0.3.
For present purposes equations (17), (18), and (19)were estimated byMLunder
Kramer's assumptions about the error terms but not under the assumption that the
equations have the same coefcients. The three coefcient restrictions, (20)(22),
were imposed, but no other coefcient restrictions were. TheML estimate of γ was
−0.479, which has the wrong sign regarding a coattail effect. The other coefcient
estimats were little changed from those in Table A.
Another ML estimation was done in which it was assumed that
ucct+2 = wt+2 − γvt (26)
This assumes that the positive coattail effect in the on-term House election is
undone in the mid-term election. It was still assumed for this specication that
wt+2 and ut have the same variance. The ML estimate of γ was −0.258, also
of the wrong expected sign.7 There is thus no evidence of a coattail effect from
7Ignoring the part of the likelihood function that does not depend on the unknown parameters,
the log of the likelihood function in this case is (T = 23):

















these results. This is consistent with the low correlation of the error terms across
equations noted above.
Ferejohn andCalvert (1984) assume regarding the error terms in the presidential
and on-term House equationis that (using the current notation):
upt = ε
p
t + vt (27)
uct = ε
c
t + γvt (28)
where εpt and ε
c
t are assumed to have the same variance, denoted, say, σ
2 and to
have covariance ρσ2, where ρ is the correlation coefcient. vt is assumed to be
uncorrelated with εpt and ε
c
t , with its variance denoted σ
2
v . This specication differs
from Kramer's in that εpt and ε
c
t are not the same. Under these assumptions, the
variance of upt is σ
2 + σ2v , the variance of u
c
t is σ




2 + γσ2v .
Now, the ML estimates in Table A yield a value of 4.26 for the variance of upt ,
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There are 20 unconstrained coefcients to estimate plus σ2u, σ
2
v , and γ, where σ
2
u is the variance
of ut and σ
2
v is the variance of vt. If the error term for the mid-term equation is Kramer's original
specication in (25) rather than (26), then wt+2 is simply V
cc
t+2 − Xcct+2αcc − λcc1 (V ct − 50) −
λcc2 (V
p
t − 50). The present likelihood function differs from Kramer's in that the coefcients are
not assumed to be the same across equations.
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these three estimates and given a value of ρ, one can solve for σ2, σ2v , and γ, with
γ the parameter of interest. Ferejohn and Calvert used their estimates to solve for
γ for values of ρ ranging from −1 to 1. The values of γ ranged from about 0.50
to 0.25, which is in the ballpark of Kramer's 0.3 estimate. In the present case,
however, the above three estimates lead to a range of γ of 0.80 to −0.71 (0.80 for
ρ = −1, 0.54 for ρ = 0, and −0.71 for ρ = 1). There is thus no information here
regarding the value of γ.
Appendix B: The Data
The data that were used for the estimates in Table 2 are presented in Table B.
Quarterly data on nominal GDP, real GDP, and population are needed to construct
G, Gcc,P , Z, P cc, and Zcc. Let GDP denote nominal GDP, let GDPR denote
real GDP, and let POP denote population. Let a subscript k denote the kth quarter
of the sixteen-quarter period of an administration. Also, let Y = GDPR/POP ,
which is real per capita GDP, and let GDPD = GDP/GDPR, which is the GDP
deator. Then G, Gcc, P , and P cc are constructed as:
G = [(Y15/Y12)
(4/3) − 1] · 100
Gcc = [(Y7/Y4)
(4/3) − 1] · 100
P = [(GDPD15/GDPD16(−1))(4/15) − 1] · 100
P cc = [(GDPD7/GDPD16(−1))(4/7) − 1] · 100
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Table B
Data for the V p and V c Equations
t V p V c I DPER DUR WAR G P Z
1916 51.682 48.881 1 1 0.00 0 2.229 4.252 3
1920 36.119 37.957 1 0 1.00 1 -11.463 0.000 0
1924 41.756 42.093 -1 -1 0.00 0 -3.872 5.161 10
1928 41.180 42.838 -1 0 -1.00 0 4.623 0.183 7
1932 59.159 56.874 -1 -1 -1.25 0 -14.499 7.200 4
1936 62.458 58.476 1 1 0.00 0 11.765 2.497 9
1940 54.999 52.967 1 1 1.00 0 3.902 0.081 8
1944 53.774 51.706 1 1 1.25 1 4.279 0.000 0
1948 52.370 53.241 1 1 1.50 1 3.579 0.000 0
1952 44.595 50.214 1 0 1.75 0 0.691 2.362 7
1956 42.236 51.212 -1 -1 0.00 0 -1.451 1.935 5
1960 50.087 54.453 -1 0 -1.00 0 0.377 1.967 5
1964 61.344 57.676 1 1 0.00 0 5.109 1.260 10
1968 49.596 50.843 1 0 1.00 0 5.043 3.139 7
1972 38.211 52.663 -1 -1 0.00 0 5.914 4.815 4
1976 51.052 57.193 -1 0 -1.00 0 3.751 7.630 5
1980 44.697 51.283 1 1 0.00 0 -3.597 7.831 5
1984 40.830 52.778 -1 -1 0.00 0 5.440 5.259 8
1988 46.098 54.012 -1 0 -1.00 0 2.178 2.906 4
1992 53.455 52.765 -1 -1 -1.25 0 2.662 3.280 2
1996 54.736 49.842 1 1 0.00 0 3.121 2.062 4
2000 50.265 49.768 1 0 1.00 0 1.219 1.605 8
2004 48.767 48.632 -1 -1 0.00 0 2.690 2.325 1
• The values of P for 1920, 1944, and 1948 before multiplication by zero are
16.535, 5.644, and 8.482, respectively, and the values of Z are 5, 14, and 5.
where (−1) means the previous four-year election period. To construct Z and Zcc
one needs to dene the growth rate in a given quarter, which for quarter k is gk =
[(Yk/Yk−1)
4−1] ·100 for quarters 2 through 16 and gk = [(Y1/Y16(−1))4−1] ·100
for quarter 1. Z is then the number of quarters in the rst 15 quarters of an
administration in which gk is greater than 3.2, and Z
cc is 15
7
times the number of
quarters in the rst 7 quarters of an administration in which gk is greater than 3.2.
The data on nominalGDPwere obtained as follows. Annual data for 1929-1945
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Table B (continued)
Data for the V cc Equation
t V cc I WAR Gcc P cc Zcc
1914 50.338
1918 45.096 1 1 22.006 0.000 0.0000
1922 46.400 -1 0 14.368 11.480 12.8571
1926 41.572 -1 0 3.461 0.117 10.7143
1930 45.871 -1 0 -11.341 2.615 4.2857
1934 56.184 1 0 12.777 4.086 8.5714
1940 50.815 1 0 4.398 0.013 6.4286
1942 47.662 1 1 15.596 0.000 0.0000
1946 45.272 1 1 -3.590 0.000 0.0000
1950 50.044 1 0 13.642 0.115 6.4286
1954 52.771 -1 0 -0.779 0.789 2.1429
1958 56.397 -1 0 -1.425 2.753 2.1429
1962 52.422 1 0 3.653 1.185 8.5714
1966 51.337 1 0 3.533 2.596 10.7143
1970 54.226 -1 0 0.009 5.056 2.1429
1974 58.629 -1 0 -2.929 8.167 4.2857
1978 54.436 1 0 6.025 6.711 8.5714
1982 56.219 -1 0 -2.872 7.062 4.2857
1986 55.085 -1 0 2.217 2.518 2.1429
1990 54.083 -1 0 0.697 3.904 4.2857
1994 46.418 1 0 2.678 2.278 4.2857
1998 49.394 1 0 2.789 1.295 8.5714
2002 47.593 -1 0 1.441 2.063 0.0000
2006 54.200 -1 0 2.324 2.965 2.1429
• Observation of V cc for 1914 needed for the V c equation.
• The values of P cc for 1918, 1942, and 1946 before multi-
plication by zero are 15.735, 7.950, and 9.558, respectively,
and the values of Zcc are 10.7143, 15.0000, and 4.2857.
and quarterly data for 1947:1-2006:3 were obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) website on October 27, 2005. Quarterly data for 1946:1-1946:4
were obtained from the BEA website on October 30, 2002. Quarterly data for
1913:1-1945:4 are available from Balke and Gordon (1986), pp. 789-795. The
Balke and Gordon values for 1913:1-1928:4 were used exactly, but the values for
1929:1-1945:4 were adjusted to take account of the new BEA annual data. For
1929:1-1945:4 each quarterly value for a given year was multiplied by a splicing
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factor for that year. The splicing factor is the ratio of the BEA value for that year
to the respective yearly value in Balke and Gordon (1976), pp. 782-783.
The data on real GDP were obtained in a similar way. Annual data for 1929-
1946 and quarterly data for 1947:1-2006:3 were obtained from the BEAwebsite on
October 27, 2006. Quarterly data for 1913:1-1946:4 are available from Balke and
Gordon (1986), pp. 789-795. The Balke and Gordon values were spliced to the
BEA values. All the Balke and Gordon quarterly values for 1913:1-1929:4 were
multiplied by the same number. This number is the ratio of the BEA value for 1929
to the 1929 value in Balke and Gordon (1976), p. 782. For 1930:1-1946:4 each
Balke and Gordon quarterly value for a given year was multiplied by a splicing
factor for that year. The splicing factor is the ratio of the BEA value for that year
to the respective yearly value in Balke and Gordon (1976), pp. 782-783.
The data on population were obtained as follows. For 1913-1928 annual data
were obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce (1973), pp. 200-201, A114
series. Each of these observations was multiplied by 1.000887, a splicing factor.
The splicing factor is the ratio of the A114 value for 1929 in U.S. Department of
Commerce (1973) to the value for 1929 in Table 8.2 in U.S. Department of Com-
merce (1992). For 1929-1945 annual data were obtained from U.S. Department
of Commerce (1992), Table 8.2. Quarterly observations for 1877:1-1945:4 were
obtained by interpolating the annual observations using the method presented in
Fair (1994), Table B.6. For 1946:1-2006:3 quarterly data were obtained from the
BEA website on October 27, 2006.
Turning now to the vote data, V p is the Democratic vote divided by the Demo-
cratic plus Republican vote except for the 1924 election. For 1924, V p is the
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Democratic vote plus .765 times the LaFollette vote divided by the Democratic
plus Republican plus LaFollette vote. The presidential vote data for 1916 were
obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975), pp. 1078-1079. For 1920-
1932 the data were obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce (1988), p. 232,
for 1936-1992 the data were obtained fromU.S. Department of Commerce (1997),
p. 271, and for 1996-2000 the data were obtained from U.S. Department of Com-
merce (2001), p. 233. The vote data for the 2004 election were obtained from the
U.S. Department of Commerce website.
V c and V cc are the Democratic House vote divided by the Democratic plus
Republican House vote. No adjustments were made to these data. The House vote
data for 19141970 were obtained from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975), p.
1084. For 1972, 1974, and 1976 the data were obtained from U.S. Department of
Commerce (1978), p. 512; for 1978 and 1980 fromU.S. Department of Commerce
(19821983), p. 481; for 1982 fromU.S.Department ofCommerce (1986), p. 245;
for 1984, 1986, and 1988 from U.S. Department of Commerce (1990), p. 249; for
1990 and 1992 from U.S. Department of Commerce (1994), p. 274; for 1994 and
1996 from U.S. Department of Commerce (1998), p. 283; for 1998 and 2000 from
U.S. Department of Commerce (2002), p. 241; for 2002 from U.S. Department
of Commerce (2004-2005), p. 244; for 2004 from U.S. Department of Commerce
(2006), p. 251; and from 2006 from David Mayhew's personal calculations.
I , DPER, DUR, and WAR are dened in the text. In the construction of
DPER Ford is not counted as an incumbent running again, since he was not an
elected vice president, whereas the other vice presidents who became president
while in ofce are counted.
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